State of Utah v. Stephen Laine Wells : Brief of Appellee by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1995
State of Utah v. Stephen Laine Wells : Brief of
Appellee
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Jan Graham, Marian Decker, Mike Christensen; attorneys for appellee.
Linda M. Jones, Elizabeth A. Bowman; Salt Lake Legal Defender Assoc.; attorneys for appellant.
This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, State of Utah v. Stephen Laine Wells, No. 950773 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1995).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/7009
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
STEPHEN LAINE WELLS, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Priority No. 2 
Case No. 950773-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
APPEAL FROM A CONVICTION FOR ATTEMPTED 
POSSESSION OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE 
(COCAINE), A CLASS A MISDEMEANOR, IN 
VIOLATION OF UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) 
(1994), IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, 
THE HONORABLE J. DENNIS FREDERICK, 
PRESIDING 
LINDA M. JONES 
ELIZABETH A. BOWMAN 
Salt Lake Legal Defender Association 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
MARIAN DECKER (5688) 
Assistant Attorney General 
JAN GRAHAM (1231) 
Utah Attorney General 
P.O. Box 140854 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854 
Telephone: (801)366-0180 
MIKE CHRISTENSEN 
Deputy Salt Lake District Attorney 
231 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE 
ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
STEPHEN LAINE WELLS, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Priority No. 2 
Case No. 950773-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
APPEAL FROM A CONVICTION FOR ATTEMPTED 
POSSESSION OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE 
(COCAINE), A CLASS A MISDEMEANOR, IN 
VIOLATION OF UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) 
(1994), IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, 
THE HONORABLE J. DENNIS FREDERICK, 
PRESIDING 
LINDA M. JONES 
ELIZABETH A. BOWMAN 
Salt Lake Legal Defender Association 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
MARIAN DECKER (5688) 
Assistant Attorney General 
JAN GRAHAM (1231) 
Utah Attorney General 
P.O. Box 140854 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854 
Telephone: (801)366-0180 
MIKE CHRISTENSEN 
Deputy Salt Lake District Attorney 
231 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE 
ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ii 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 1 
ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW .. 1 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 2 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 3 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 6 
ARGUMENT 
THE WARRANTLESS SEIZURE OF COCAINE FROM DEFENDANT'S 
JACKET WAS JUSTIFIED BY THE SEARCH INCIDENT TO ARREST 
EXCEPTION TO THE WARRANT REQUIREMENT 6 
CONCLUSION 17 
ADDENDA 
Addendum A - Memorandum in Support of Motion to Suppress 
Addendum B - Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law Denying Motion 
To Suppress Evidence 
i 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
FEDERAL CASES 
Davis v. Robbs. 794 F.2d 1129 (6th Cir.), cert, denied. 479 U.S. 992 (1986) 12 
New York v.Belton. 453 U.S. 454 (1981) 8, 11 
United States v. Bennett. 908 F.2d 189 (7th CkX cert, denied. 498 U.S. 991 H990^ .. 12 
United States v. Chadwick. 433 U.S. 1 (1977) 8 
United States v. Lucas. 898 F.2d 606 (8th Cir.), cert, denied. 498 U.S. 838 (1990) . . . 12 
United States v. Parra. 2 F.3d 1058 (10th Cir.), 
cert, denied. U.S. , 114 S.Ct. 639(1993) 11 
United States v. Roper. 681 F.2d 1354 (11th Cir. 1982), 
cert, denied. 459 U.S. 1207 (1983) 12 
United States v. Silva. 745 F.2d 840 (4th Cir. 1984), 
cert, denied. 470 U.S. 1031 (1985) 12 
Virgin Islands v. Rasool. 656 F.2d 582 (3rd Cir. 1981) 12 
Washington v. Chrisman. 455 U.S. 1 (1982) 8 
STATE CASES 
Commonwealth v. Wheatlev. 402 A.2d 1047 (Pa. Super. 1979) 9 
People v.Hufhagel. 745 P.2d242 (Colo. 1987) 12 
People v.Lyda, 327N.E.2d494 (111. App. Ct. 1975) 9 
State v. Archambeau. 820 P.2d 920 (Utah App. 1991) 17 
ii 
State v. Ashe. 745 P.2d 1255 (Utah 1987) 15 
State v. Austin. 584 P.2d 853 (Utah 1978) 8,10 
State v. Beavers. 859 P.2d 9 (Utah App. 1993) 14 
State v. Dunn. 850 P.2d 1201 (Utah 1993) 17 
State v. Harrison. 805 P.2d 769 (Utah App.), 
cert, denied. 817 P.2d 327 (Utah 199n 11 
State v. Johnson. 774 P.2d 1141 (Utah 1989) 16 
State v. LeBlanc. 347 A.2d 590 (Me. 1975) 9 
State v. Moosman. 794 P.2d 474 (Utah 1990) 13 
State vt Moreno, 910 P.2d 1245 (Utah App.), cert, denied 2, 9, 10, 11, 13, 16 
State v. Murdock. 455 N.W.2d 618 (Wis. 1990) 12 
State v. Ortiz. 782 P.2d 959 (Utah App. 1989) 16, 17 
State v. Parker. 337 S.E.2d 487 (N.C. 1985) 9 
State v. Price. 827 P.2d 247 (UtahApp. 1992) 7 
State v. Rowe. 850 P.2d 427 (Utah 1992) 14 
State v. Smith. 835 P.2d 1025 (Wash. 1992) 12 
State v. Strader. 902 P.2d 638 (UtahApp. 1995), cert, denied 6 
West Vallev City v. Majestic Investment Co.. 818P.2d 1311 (UtahApp. 1991) 13 
Young v. United States. 670 A.2d 903 (D.C. App. 1996) 10 
iii 
FEDERAL STATUTES 
U.S. Const. Amend. IV 2 
STATE STATUTES 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8 (1994) 1,2 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (Supp. 1995) 2 
Utah R. App. P. 24 7 
iv 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : Priority No. 2 
v. : 
STEPHEN LATNE WELLS, : Case No. 950773-CA 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Defendant appeals his conviction for attempted possession of a controlled 
substance (cocaine), a class A misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-
8(2)(a)(i) (1994). This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) 
(Supp. 1995). 
ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL AND 
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
Did the trial court correctly conclude that the warrantless seizure of 
evidence was justified by both the exigent circumstances and the search incident to 
arrest exception to the warrant requirement? 
A trial court's factual findings in support of its determination to deny a 
motion to suppress evidence are reviewed under the "deferential clearly-erroneous 
standard." State v. Moreno. 910 P.2d 1245,1247 (Utah App.), cert, denied. Case No. 
960094 (Utah April 23, 1996). A trial court's supporting legal conclusions are "reviewed 
for correctness, with a measure of discretion given to the trial judge's application of the 
legal standard to the facts." 14 (citing State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932, 935-40 (Utah 1994). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES. AND RULES 
U.S. Const Amend. IV: 
The right of the people to be secure in their person, houses, 
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and 
seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, 
but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, 
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the 
persons or things to be seized. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged with possession of a controlled substance (cocaine) 
with intent to distribute, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-
8(l)(a)(iv) (1994), and possession of a controlled substance (marijuana), a class B 
misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (1994) (R. 11-12). 
Prior to trial, defendant moved to suppress the physical evidence seized 
pursuant to a warrantless search of his apartment (R. 40-45) (a copy is contained in 
addendum A). Following an evidentiary hearing (R. 137-69), the motion was denied (R. 
165-69,109-13) (a copy of the written findings and conclusions is contained in addendum 
B). 
Thereafter, defendant entered a conditional guilty plea to the reduced 
charge of attempted possession of cocaine, a class A misdemeanor and the marijuana 
charge was dismissed (R. 98-99,100-06). 
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The trial court sentenced defendant to a one year term which the court 
ordered to be served at the Utah State Prison concurrently with terms defendant was then 
serving (R. 115). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Defendant, Stephen Laine Wells, and his girlfriend, codefendant Kelly 
Jensen, are known drug users with a history of narcotics related arrests (R. 49, 51, 54, 59, 
152,156-57). On December 27,1993, four deputy sherriffs attempted to execute arrest 
warrants for each at defendant's Salt Lake County apartment on yet more drug related 
charges (R. 49, 51, 54, 66, 156). 
Defendant responded to a plain-clothed deputy's knock by opening a sliding 
glass door approximately one/half inch (R. 49). When the deputy asked if "Steve Wells" 
lived there, defendant denied his identity and claimed that no one by that name lived in 
the apartment (R. 49). Upon hearing defendant's denial, Deputy Russo, who had 
previously arrested defendant, stepped around the comer and into defendant's view (R. 
49,156). Defendant immediately yelled "It's Russo again! Its Russo again!" and fled 
down the stairs into the apartment (R. 50,161). Defendant also began pulling something 
out of his pocket (R. 50, 52,161). 
Deputy Russo yelled that he had arrest warrants for defendant and 
codefendant and requested that defendant open the sliding glass door, which could not be 
opened from the outside due to a wooden dowel in the inside track (R. 50,161). When 
defendant did not respond, Deputy Russo threatened to break the glass door (R. 50,161). 
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Defendant again failed to respond and the deputy smashed out the glass with a nearby 
shovel (R. 50). 
Deputy Sterner pursued defendant into the apartment and was immediately 
bitten by defendant's dog (R. 65,147). As the injured deputy arrested and handcuffed 
defendant at the bottom of the stairs, the other deputies attempted to control and gas the 
dog (R. 53, 65-66, 147). Following defendant's arrest, Deputy Russo found codefendant 
hiding in the bedroom closet and arrested her as well (id.). 
Following her arrest, codefendant "took [Deputy Russo] aside" and 
informed him that defendant had "put" cocaine in his jacket on the bed (R. 50, 66). 
Defendant stood within "several feet" of codefendant and Deputy Russo at the time of 
this communication (R. 56, 66-67). Deputy Russo recognized the jacket as one that 
defendant had worn on previous encounters with the deputy (R. 67-68). Realizing that 
defendant could have hidden contraband in the time it took the deputies to enter the 
apartment, the jacket was immediately searched and one quarter ounce ball of cocaine 
was seized (R. 52-53, 67-68,161). 
Codefendant also directed the deputies to look in a vacuum cleaner near the 
area of defendant's arrest, claiming that defendant had hidden marijuana inside that as 
well (R. 50,66-67,150-51,159). One quarter ounce, or approximately seven grams of 
marijuana was similarly seized from the vacuum cleaner (R. 159). 
Additionally, Deputy Sterner observed a baggie containing marijuana in the 
bedroom, "across the bed" (R. 148,159). As the deputy bent to retrieve the marijuana he 
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observed two marijuana pipes "on the floor next to where the marijuana" had been found 
(R. 149, 159). 
Following the arrests and seizure of contraband from defendant's jacket, 
vacuum cleaner and bed, police determined that no other individuals were in the 
apartment (R. 164). No further search was conducted (id.). Before leaving the apartment, 
and as a result of the broken door, the deputies requested a friend of defendant's to secure 
the apartment (R. 67). 
Defendant did not testify or otherwise present evidence below. 
The above evidence summary essentially tracks the trial court's factual 
findings (see R. 166-67 (oral ruling) and R. 110-13, SS£ addendum B). In particular, the 
trial court found that defendant could have been pulling either a weapon or contraband 
from his pocket as he ran down the stairs; that the deputies only searched objects that 
codefendant directed them to search; and that jacket wherein the cocaine was found could 
have easily hidden a weapon and/or contraband (R. 112, see addendum B). Accordingly, 
the trial court upheld the seizure of contraband, reasoning that the officers entry into the 
apartment to execute the arrest warrants was justified by exigent circumstances, and that 
the seizure of contraband from defendant's jacket and from the vacuum cleaner was 
justified by both the exigencies of the situation and as incident to defendant's arrest (R. 
112-13,167, £££ addendum B). 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The limited and contemporaneous seizure of cocaine from defendant's 
jacket was justified as incident to defendant's warrant-supported arrest on drug related 
charges. As such, this Court need not consider the trial court's alternative exigent 
circumstances justification for the seizure; particularly where defendant has not properly 
marshalled the evidence supporting that determination and thus has not demonstrated any 
clear error therein. 
Defendant's allegation concerning the State's failure to obtain a telephonic 
warrant is waived due to his failure to invoke a ruling on that issue below. 
ARGUMENT 
THE WARRANTLESS SEIZURE OF COCAINE FROM 
DEFENDANT'S JACKET WAS JUSTIFIED BY THE 
SEARCH INCIDENT TO ARREST EXCEPTION TO 
THE WARRANT REQUIREMENT1 
Defendant does not dispute that Salt Lake County deputies were justified in 
entering his apartment to effectuate his and codefendant's arrests on drug-related charges. 
Br. of Aplt. 19 n. 8. Nor does he dispute that the deputies had probable cause to search for 
contraband inside the apartment. Br. of Aplt. at 18. Rather, defendant narrowly claims 
1
 Because the marijuana charge, which was based on the marijuana recovered 
from the vacuum cleaner and bed, was dismissed pursuant to the parties plea agreement 
(R. 98-99, 100-06), the State narrows its response solely to the justification for the seizure 
of cocaine from defendant's jacket which is the basis for the conviction on appeal. See 
State v. Strader. 902 P.2d 638,640 (Utah App. 1995) (refusing to considering validity of 
charge dismissed as part of the plea arrangement), cert, denied. Case No. 950541 (Utah 
April 4,1996). 
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that the subsequent warrantless seizure of cocaine from his jacket was not justified by 
exigent circumstances because he and codefendant were arrested and handcuffed when 
the jacket was searched. Br. of Aplt. at 18-23. Defendant's narrow challenge to the trial 
court's ruling overlooks the fact that the court also upheld the seizure as incident to his 
lawful drug-related arrest. Because the seizure of cocaine from defendant's jacket is 
clearly justified under the latter exception alone, the Court need not consider defendant's 
challenge to the trial court's alternative exigent circumstances justification for the seizure. 
Indeed, the Court should not consider defendant's challenge to the trial court's 
determination of exigent circumstances because defendant has not properly marshalled 
the supporting evidence. 
Search Incident to Arrest 
Defendant only nominally challenges the trial court's determination that the 
seizure of cocaine was justified by the search incident to arrest exception to the warrant 
requirement, broadly alleging, with no record support, that the deputies' search incident 
to the arrests of defendant and codefendant did not encompass defendant's jacket. &££ 
Br. of Aplt. at 17 n.7. Defendant's cursory assertion is not supported by the record and 
should be rejected on that ground. $££ Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9) (requiring appellant to 
ground claims of error in the record and to support them with legal analysis and 
authority); State v. Price, 827 P.2d 247,249 (Utah App. 1992) (declining to reach 
argument unsupported in the record). 
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As recently noted by this Court, "[i]t is well settled that a 'lawful custodial 
arrest creates a situation which justifies the contemporaneous search without warrant of 
the person arrested and of the immediately surrounding area." State v. Moreno. 910 P.2d 
1245, 1247 (Utah App. 1996) (quoting Chimel v. California. 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969)), 
cert, denied. Case No. 960094 (Utah April 23, 1996). A limited and contemporaneous 
search incident to arrest is necessary "to remove any weapons that the arrestee might seek 
to use . . . as well as to search for and seize any evidence on the arrestee's person or 
within his immediate control to prevent [its] concealment or destruction[.]" Moreno. 910 
P.2d at 1247. See also. State v. Austin. 584 P.2d 853, 855 (Utah 1978) (search incident 
to a lawful arrest justified to protect police or third persons and to preserve evidence). 
Consequently, a search incident to arrest may be conducted regardless of whether there is 
probable cause to believe that the arrestee has a weapon or is about to destroy evidence. 
United States v. Chadwick. 433 U.S. 1,15 (1977). Indeed, "[t]he potential dangers 
lurking in all custodial arrests make warrantless searches of items within the 'immediate 
control' area reasonable without requiring the arresting officer to calculate the probability 
that weapons or destructible evidence may be involved." Id. (citation omitted). &££ New 
York v. Belton. 453 U.S. 454,463 (1981) ("A custodial arrest of a suspect based on 
probable cause is a reasonable intrusion under the Fourth Amendment; that intrusion 
being lawful, a search incident to the arrest requires no additional justification."). £££ 
also. Washington v. Chrisman. 455 U.S. 1,7 (1982) ("Every arrest must be presumed to 
present a risk of danger to the arresting officer."). Accordingly, any "doubt" concerning 
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the arrestee's actual ability to access weapons or contraband due to "distance, or police 
restraint," does not prohibit police from searching the immediate area. Moreno. 910 P.2d 
at 1247. 
Based on the above, the trial court properly ruled that the contemporaneous 
and limited search of defendant's jacket, resulting in the seizure of cocaine, was justified 
as incident to defendant's arrest (R. 112-13, S££ addendum B; R. 167 (oral ruling)). 
While the trial court made no express finding as to defendant's precise proximity to the 
jacket at the time of search, the record reflects that defendant was within several feet (R. 
56,66-67). As such, the jacket was within an area of defendant's immediate control. 
Indeed, courts routinely uphold contemporaneous searches of an arrestee's clothing when 
it is discovered in the immediate area of the arrest. See, e.g.. State v. Parker. 337 S.E.2d 
487,489-90 (N.C. 1985) (upholding warrantless search of jacket located within three or 
four feet of defendant at the time of his arrest); Commonwealth v. Wheatley. 402 A.2d 
1047, 1050 (Pa. Super. 1979) (where defendant was discovered in kitchen and appeared 
to have been "shooting" heroin-search of defendant's jacket hanging on kitchen chair 
was proper as incident to his arrest); State v. LeBlanc. 347 A.2d 590, 595-96 (Me. 1975) 
(jacket within eight to ten feet of defendant held to be within the area of his "lunge, reach 
or grasp;" thus, jacket search justified as incident to defendant's arrest); People v. Lyda. 
327 NJE.2d 494,497-98 (111. App. Ct. 1975) (upholding seizure of jacket hanging on 
nearby wall at time of defendant's drug-related arrest). Defendant ciites no contrary 
authority. 
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Handcuffing is Not Determinative of Seizure's Reasonableness 
Rather, defendant narrowly claims that because he was handcuffed when 
the jacket was searched, the jacket was not at his "disposal" and therefore the deputies 
could not have reasonably feared for their safety or for the possible destruction of 
evidence. Br. of Aplt. at 19-23. As previously noted, however, a search incident to arrest 
requires no additional justification than an arrest supported by probable cause (discussion, 
supra at 9), and the validity of the arrest is not challenged here. See Br. of Aplt. at 19 n.8. 
Contrary to defendant's suggestion, a search incident to arrest is evaluated under a 
standard of objective reasonableness without regard to the underlying intent or motivation 
of the police involved. Young v. United States, 670 A.2d 903, 908 (D.C. App. 1996) (It 
is the fact of custodial arrest which gives rise to authority to search; therefore, the 
subjective beliefs of police are of no moment) (citing Scott v. United States. 436 U.S. 
128,138(1978)). 
Moreover, the Utah Supreme Court previously considered and rejected a 
similar challenge to the validity of a search incident to arrest in State v. Austin. 584 P.2d 
853 (Utah 1978). Like defendant, Austin did not challenge the validity of his custodial 
arrest, but claimed that because he was handcuffed at the time of the incidental search, he 
did not have 'control' over the immediate area searched and thus the search could not be 
justified under the Chimel exception to the warrant requirement. Austin. 584 P.2d at 855. 
The supreme court rejected Austin's claim, holding that a suspect in custody "need not be 
physically able to move about in order to justify a search within a limited area once an 
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arrest has been made." IJL at 856. Assuming a valid arrest,"[a]ny subsequent search of 
the immediate area, whether to find concealed weapons or to preserve evidence that was 
in danger of being destroyed, [is] proper." IJL Accord Moreno. 910 P.2d at 1247 ("doubt 
about the arrestee's ability to access weapons or evidence in a particular area because of 
distance, or police restraint, does not prohibit police from properly searching that area"). 
By emphasizing that it is the legitimacy of the custodial arrest, and not the probability of 
any exigency, that authorizes a limited search of the immediate area, Austin and Moreno 
are consistent with ChimeL Chadwick and Belton. Indeed, the United States Supreme 
Court upheld the warrantless seizure in Belton even though the arrestees had been 
removed from the vehicle and separated prior to the vehicle search-circumstances where 
the possibility of one of the arrestees accessing the evidence was at least as remote as if 
they had been handcuffed. 453 U.S. at 456,462-63. See alss State v. Harrison. 805 P.2d 
769, 784-85 (Utah App.), cert, denied. 817 R2d 327 (Utah 1991) (upholding search 
incident to arrest where arrestee was lying on the ground guarded by police 
approximately 10 feet away from diaper bag found to contain weapon). 
Numerous other jurisdictions, including a majority of the federal courts of 
appeal, agree that methods like handcuffing which are used to gain control over an 
arrestee and his actual access to weapons and/or evidence do not eviscerate the authority 
to conduct a limited, contemporaneous search incident to arrest. £§e United States v. 
Parra. 2 F.3d 1058,1066 (10th Cir.) (upholding search incident to arrest even though 
"hindsight" suggests that handcuffed defendants "had little chance of reaching" suspected 
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weapon), cert, denied. U.S. , 114 S.Ct 639 (1993); United States v. Bennett. 908 
F.2d 189. 194 (7th Cir.) (upholding search of handcuffed defendant's luggage and 
recognizing that custodial arrests are inherently dangerous and that police are not required 
to presume that an arrestee is a wholly rational individual unlikely to attempt any dubious 
action), cert, denied. 498 U.S. 991 (1990); United States v. Lucas. 898 F.2d 606, 610 (8th 
Cir.) (struggling arrestee subdued and handcuffed prior to search of nearby cabinet), cert, 
denied. 498 U.S. 838 (1990); Davis v. Robbs. 794 F.2d 1129, 1130-31 (6th Cir.) (arrestee 
handcuffed and placed in squad car prior to seizure of rifle in house), cert, denied. 479 
U.S. 992 (1986); United States v. Silva. 745 F.2d 840, 847 (4th Cir. 1984) (arrestees 
handcuffed and guarded by federal agents prior to search of room for weapons), cert, 
denied. 470 U.S. 1031 (1985); United States v. Roper. 681 F.2d 1354, 1358-59 (11th Cir. 
1982) (arrestee handcuffed in hallway of motel and escorted inside room by federal 
agents prior to search of unlocked metal briefcase), cert, denied. 459 U.S. 1207 (1983); 
Virgin Islands v. Rasool. 656 F.2d 582, 586 (3rd Cir. 1981) (arrestee handcuffed and 
removed from automobile prior to search). &££ also State v. Smith. 835 P.2d 1025, 1029 
(Wash. 1992) (handcuffing defendant prior to searching his fannypack deemed reasonable 
safety precaution); State v. Murdock. 455 N.W.2d 618,624 (Wis. 1990) ("actual 
accessibility" is not the "benchmark" determining authority and scope of search incident 
to arrest--"[a]rrests are tense and risky undertakings during which many activities 
necessarily happen simultaneously"); People v. HufiiageL 745 P.2d 242,247 (Colo. 1987) 
(no need to show handcuffed "arrestee was physically able to reach the exact place 
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searched at the exact second it was searched in order to justify search incident to arrest;" 
rather, prosecution need only show search was contemporaneous with arrest and limited 
to immediate area). 
Failure to Marshal Exigent Circumstances Evidence 
Because the search of defendant's jacket is amply justified as incident to his 
lawful drug-related arrest this Court need not reach the trial court's alternative exigent 
circumstances justification for the seizure. Sfi£ Moreno. 910 P.2d at 1247 (declining to 
reach exigent circumstances justification for warrantless search because seizure of 
contraband was clearly proper as a search incident to arrest). Indeed, the Court should 
not reach the issue because defendant has not properly challenged the trial court's exigent 
circumstances ruling on appeal. West Valley Citv v. Majestic Inv. Co.. 818 P.2d 1311, 
1315 (Utah App. 1991). It is defendant's burden to marshal all of the supporting 
evidence and to demonstrate that the evidence, including all reasonable inferences drawn 
therefrom, is insufficient to support the trial court's findings. State v. Moosman. 794 
P.2d 474,476 (Utah 1990). While defendant arguably recites most of the evidence 
presented below, he fails to view that evidence in the light most favorable to the trial 
court's exigent circumstances determination. Rather, defendant narrowly focuses solely 
on the fact that the deputies eventually successfully subdued both defendants, claiming 
that the arrests extinguished any then existing exigency necessitating a search of his 
jacket. Br. of Aplt. at 20-23. However, overlooked by defendant, Deputy Russo testified 
and the trial court expressly found that the deputies were not able to determine that no 
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individuals other than defendant and codefendant remained in the apartment until 
sometime after the arrests (R. 164, 167-68 (oral ruling)). Defendant's sufficiency 
challenge should fail on this oversight alone. 
In any event, the record substantially supports the trial court's 
determination that the subsequent warrantless search was justified by exigent 
circumstances. Defendant's assetion to the contrary is not supported by her reliance on 
State v. Beavers, 859 P.2d 9 (Utah App. 1993). Beavers addressed the question of 
whether exigent circumstances existed to justify a warrantless entry, i i at 18-1. As noted 
previously, defendant does not dispute that the arrest warrant authorized the deputies 
entry into his apartment to effectuate the arrests. Br. of Aplt. at 19 n.8. &ee State v. 
Rowe. 850 P.2d 427, 429 (Utah 1992) (arrest warrant authorized day or night entry of 
home to effectuate arrest). Any consequent exigency was created by defendant himself 
when he fled the deputies admittedly lawful attempt to arrest him. 
Indeed, defendant fled down the stairs into his apartment yelling a warning 
to potential and as yet unknown occupants (R. 50-52, 161). Defendant was also observed 
to pull "something" from his pocket (idL). The deputies made repeated requests for 
defendant to open the sliding glass door and thereby avoid the deputies having to break 
through the glass, which requests defendant ignored (j&). Because both defendants were 
known drug users (R. 49, 51, 54, 59,152,156-57), Deputy Russo reasonably feared 
defendant was using this time to conceal and/or destroy contraband (R. 52). 
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Additionally, once the deputies gained entry to the apartment, Deputy 
Sterner was immediately attacked and bitten by defendant's dog (R. 65,147). The four 
deputies then faced the difficult task of subduing the dog, locating and arresting defendant 
and codefendant, and determining whether any other unknown individual was hiding 
inside (R. 53, 65-66,147). Indeed, Deputy Russo had frequently observed a lot of short 
term traffic consistent with drug distribution to and from defendant's apartment (R. 68). 
Codefendant, who was located hiding in the bedroom closet, confirmed the deputies 
concern about the preservation of evidence, indicating that defendant had concealed drugs 
in his jacket and in the vacuum cleaner (R. 50, 66-67, 150-51,159). Although no deputy 
expressly testified that he was concerned for his safety, it is an inference reasonably 
drawn from the chaotic and tension filled circumstances surrounding the 
contemporaneous entry and arrest of both defendants. 
While police in Beavers could not have reasonably feared that immediate 
action was necessitated to avoid the destruction and/or concealment of approximately 91 
leather coats, 14. at 18, the above facts demonstrate that the instant deputies were 
reasonably concerned for the possible destruction of suspected narcotics. £££ State v. 
Ashe, 745 P.2d 1255,1260 (Utah 1987) (upon making valid warrantless entry police 
heard sound of flushing toilet and reasonably believed defendant was attempting to 
destroy suspected narcotics). 
Based on the foregoing, the trial court's exigent circumstances 
determination is well supported and defendant's challenge thereto should be rejected. 
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Moreno, 910 P.2d at 1247 (rejecting sufficiency challenge and deferring to trial court's 
factual findings "since they are substantially supported by the record, and therefore not 
clearly erroneous"). 
Failure to Preserve and to Invoke Ruling on Telephonic Warrant Issue 
Finally, defendant claims that the State failed to present evidence below 
concerning the availability of a telephonic warrant and that therefore the State failed to 
justify the warrantless search. Br. of Aplt. at 25-26. Defendant only nominally 
challenged the State's failure to obtain a telephonic warrant in a footnote to his written 
motion to suppress evidence (R. 45, see addendum A). Defendant did not argue the issue 
either at the preliminary hearing (R. 47-73) or at the evidentiary hearing on his motion to 
suppress (R. 137-164). Consequently, the trial court never addressed or otherwise ruled 
on the issue (R. 164-68 (oral ruling); R. 109-13 (written ruling), see addendum B). 
"Without a record of a ruling below," this Court "cannot review defendant's 
claim of error on appeal." State v. Ortiz. 782 P.2d 959, 961 (Utah App. 1989). "As a 
general rule it is the objecting party's obligation to obtain a ruling on the objection, or 
such objection is waived on appeal." LL If defendant was truly concerned that the 
deputies did not obtain a telephonic warrant, he should have preserved the issue in the 
trial court and pressed that ground as a basis for finding the warrantless seizure 
unreasonable. State v. Johnson. 774 P.2d 1141,1144-45 (Utah 1989) (grounds for 
objection must be "distinctly and specifically" stated in the trial court). Because he failed 
to do so and to obtain a ruling thereon, defendant is precluded from raising the claim for 
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the first time in this Court. JLcL; Ortiz. 782 P.2d at 961. Defendant argues no plain error or 
other exceptional circumstance that would excuse his waiver of this issue. State v. Dunn. 
850 P.2d 1201, 1208-09 (Utah 1993); State v. Archambeau. 820 P.2d 920, 925 (Utah 
App. 1991) (defendant precluded from presenting constitutional issue for first time on 
appeal absent demonstration of plain error or exceptional circumstances). The issue is 
therefore waived and should not be considered. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, the Court should affirm the trial court's denial of 
defendant's motion to suppress and should also affirm defendant's class A misdemeanor 
conviction. 
Due to the fact dependent nature of the fourth amendment and issue 
preservation questions raised in this case, the analytical paths that may be taken are many. 
Accordingly, oral argument would greatly assist resolution of the issues and should be 
entertained. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted th i s^4ay of April, 1996. 
JAN GRAHAM 
Utah Attorney General 
MARIAN DECKER 
Assistant Attorney General 
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Third Judicial District 
ELIZABETH A. BOWMAN, #4276 
Attorney for Defendant 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOCIATION 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 532-5444 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : MEMORANDUM IN 8UPP0RT OP 
MOTION TO 8UPPRESS 
Plaintiff, : 
vs. : 
STEVEN LAINE WELLS, : Case No. 941900344FS 
Defendant. : JUDGE J. DENNIS FREDERICK 
COMES NOW the defendant, STEVEN LAINE WELLS, by and through 
his attorney, ELIZABETH A. BOWMAN, and respectfully submits this 
Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion to Suppress. 
FACTS 
On December 27, 1993, four Salt Lake City police officers 
approached Mr. Wells' home for the purpose of arresting Mr. Wells 
and Kelly Jensen. The officers had a legitimate arrest warrant for 
Mr. Wells based on a prior unrelated violation. An officer not 
known to Mr. Wells, (Paul Barton) knocked on the door while Officer 
Russo identified Mr. Wells through the sliding glass door (T14)1. 
Mr. Wells denied the officers entry into his home and the officers 
forced their way in by breaking the sliding glass doors in the rear 
1 tiTi! refers to Preliminary Hearing transcript (copy 
attached). 
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of the house (T4)• 
Once the officers were inside, they arrested and handcuffed 
Mr. Wells and Kelly Jensen. No one else was present in the home. 
The officers detained Mr. Wells and his girlfriend. After 
questioning by the police officers# the girlfriend told the 
officers that Mr. Wells had drugs stored inside the vacuum cleaner 
and inside the lining of his jacket (T4). The officers retrieved 
cocaine from the lining of the jacket and marijuana from inside the 
vacuum cleaner (T5). None of the officers had a warrant to search 
Mr. Wells' home (T16). 
IAW 
The fourth amendment of the United States Constitution states: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no 
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported 
by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the 
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be 
seized. U.S. Const. Amend. IV. 
Article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution states: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 
searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no 
warrant shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported 
by oath or affirmation, particularly describing the place 
to be searched, and the persons or thing to be seized. 
The relevant portions of Utah's Search and Administrative 
Warrants Act is as follows: 
77-23-202. Grounds for issuance. 
Property or evidence may be seized pursuant to a search 
warrant if there is probable cause to believe it: 
(1) was unlawfully acquired or is unlawfully possessed; 
(2) has been used or is possessed for the purpose of 
being used to commit or conceal the commission of an offense; 
or 
a 
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(3) is evidence of illegal conduct. 
Utah Code Ann. 77-23-202 (1994). 
77-23-203. Conditions precedent to issuance. 
(1) A search warrant shall not issue except upon probable 
cause supported by oath or affirmation particularly describing 
the person or place to be searched and the person, property, 
or evidence to be seized. 
(2) If the item sought to be seized is evidence of 
illegal conduct, and is in the possession of a person or 
entity for which there is insufficient probable cause shown to 
the magistrate to believe that such person or entity is a 
party to the alleged illegal conduct, no search warrant shall 
issue except upon a finding by the magistrate that the 
evidence sought to be seized cannot be obtained by subpoena, 
or that such evidence would be concealed, destroyed, damaged, 
or altered if sought by subpoena. If such a finding is mad4 
and a search warrant issued, the magistrate shall direct upon 
the warrant such conditions that reasonably afford protectioA 
of the following interests of the person or entity in 
possession of such evidence: 
(a) protection against unreasonable interference with 
normal business; 
(b) protection against the loss or disclosure of 
protected confidential sources of information; or 
(c) protection against prior or direct restraints on 
constitutionally protected rights. 
Utah Code Ann. 77-23-203 (1994). 
ARGUMENT 
The Warrantless Search of Mr, Wells# Home was Unreasonable. 
The search and seizure of Mr. Wells' property without a search 
warrant was per se unreasonable and unconstitutional. The United 
States Supreme Court held that warrantless searches "are per se 
unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment - subject only to a few 
specifically established and well-delineated exceptions." Katz. v. 
United States. 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967). This understanding is 
grounded on the principle that the right to privacy in one's own 
home is fundamental. More recently, the Court held that "[a]bsent 
exigent circumstances, that threshold [privacy expectation in the 
home] may not be reasonably crossed without a warrant." Pavton v. 
3 
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New York. 445 U.S. 573, 590 (1980). The State has the burden of 
proving a warrantless search and seizure was reasonable. 
Nonetheless, warrantless entry based on probable cause and 
exigent circumstances can provide a constitutionally reasonable 
exception to the right of privacy. The Utah Supreme Court held 
that these "exceptions are jealously and carefully drawn, and there 
must be a showing by those who seek exemption.. .that the exigencies 
of the situation made the search imperative." State v. Ashe, 745 
P.2d 1255, 1258 (Utah 1987). In Ashe, the Court upheld the 
warrantless search because the police heard the defendant flush 
drugs down the toilet and because the police believed that the 
defendant was likely to escape from the home. No such exigencies 
exist in the case at bar. 
The Officers Lacked Exigent Circumstances to Search Mr. 
Wells/ Home Without A Search Warrant 
There were no exigent circumstances to justify the warrantless 
search of Mr. Wells' home. The United States Supreme Court has 
identified four exigencies which justify the warrantless entry of 
a home: 1) hot pursuit of a fleeing felon; 2) imminent destruction 
of evidence; 3) the need to prevent a suspect's escape; and 4) the 
risk of harm to the police or to others, inside or outside the 
dwelling. Minnesota v. Olsen. 495 U.S. 91, 100 (1990). 
Correspondingly, the Utah Court of Appeals explained the four 
exigent circumstances for a warrantless seizure as: 1) prevention 
of physical harm to the officers or other persons, 2) the 
destruction of relevant evidence, 3) the escape of the suspect, 4) 
or some other consequence improperly frustrating legitimate law 
4 
0 0 0 f 4 3 
enforcement efforts. The appellate court elaborated further and 
stated that "the need for an immediate search must be apparent to 
the police, and so strong as to outweigh the important protection 
of individual rights provided by the warrant requirement.11 State of 
Utah v. Beavers, 859 P.2d 9, 18 (UT App. 1993). 
In Beavers. the police suspected the defendant of stealing 
coats from two clothing stores. The police entered the defendant's 
home and seized the coats without a search warrant. The defendant 
appealed his burglary conviction on the grounds that the 
warrantless seizure was unconstitutional. In applying the exigent 
circumstances exceptions to the facts in Beavers, the Court quickly 
concluded that the police could not reasonably believe that the 
coats would be destroyed or that the defendant would flee by 
jumping through his second story window if the officers took the 
time to obtain a search warrant. Next, the Court found that the 
officer safety exception did not apply because the officer did not 
think to look for weapons and had no reason to believe that the 
defendant possessed a weapon. Thus, the appellate court reversed 
the conviction on the basis that there were no exigent 
circumstances to justify the warrantless search. 
Similarly, the officers in the present case could not have 
reasonably believed that the drugs would be destroyed or that Mr. 
Wells wold flee if the officers obtained a search warrant. As four 
police officers immediately handcuffed Mr. Wells and his 
girlfriend, it was unlikely that they could destroy the evidence or 
flee. Furthermore, because the drugs were located in two other 
5 
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rooms of the house, the drugs were effectively inaccessible to Mr. 
Wells. Finally, neither Mr. Wells nor his girlfriend were violent 
or dangerous to the four officers. Thus there was no "substantial 
risk of harm" to the officers or anyone else to justify the 
warrantless search. Id. In sum, because the four officers 
immediately secured the home and its occupants, there was no 
imperative need to search the home without a warrant.2 Hence, the 
evidence must be suppressed because the warrantless search and 
seizure was unconstitutional. 
SUMMARY 
Mr. Wells asks this Court to suppress the evidence gathered 
against him because the officers did not have exigent circumstances 
to search his home without a search warrant. Mr. Wells and his 
girlfriend were immediately handcuffed and detained. They could 
not destroy evidence, flee, or harm the officers. No weapons, 
contraband or drugs were within the officers' immediate view. In 
this case, the four officers had the home and the occupants secure 
such that it was unreasonable for them to search and seize Mr. 
Wells' property without first obtaining a search warrant. 
DATED this 30th day of September, 1994. 
f Atto] 
LJ^ABETlf A. B.efoM&N 
Attorney for Defendant 
2
 Because there were four officers and no other occupants, the 
officers could have easily secured the property and attempted to 
obtain a telephonic search warrant pursuant to Utah Code Annotated 
§77-23-4 based in the girlfriend's statements. 
eoon? 
MAILED/DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing to the Office of the 
Salt Lake County Attorney at 231 East 400 South, Salt Lake City, 
Utah 84111 this 30th day of September, 1994. 
7 
0 0 0 0 4 P 
ADDENDUM B 
DAVIDE. YOCOM ' " '" '" r' ^ * 
Salt Lake County Attorney Arrrovi iaau 
MICHAEL J. CHRISTENSEN, Bar No. 0643 u w l £ H , m H 
Deputy County Attorney 
2001 South State Street, S3700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84190-1200 
Telephone: (801)468-3422 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
STEPHEN LAINE WELLS, 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW DENYING 
MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE 
CaseNo.941900344FS 
Judge J. Dennis Frederick 
On the 3rd day of October, 1994, at the hour of 10:00 a.m., this matter came before 
this Court, pursuant to a pre-trial Motion to Suppress Evidence, filed by counsel for the above-
said defendant. Present at said hearing, were Elizabeth Bowman, counsel for defendant; Michael 
J. Christensen, Deputy Salt Lake County Attorney, representing the State of Utah; and Salt Lake 
County Deputies: Robby Russo, Paul Barker, and Gary Sterner, who were subpoenaed by the 
State and the defendant. 
Defendant, prior to said hearing, had submitted a Memorandum in Support of 
Motion to Suppress Evidence, along with a verbatim transcript of the Preliminary Hearing held 
in this matter, before Judge Michael Burton, Murray Circuit Court, on the 24th day of August, 
1994; in which defendant was bound over to stand trial on one count of possession of controlled 
substance (cocaine), a Third Degree Felony, and one count of possession of a controlled 
substance (marijuana), a Class B Misdemeanor. 
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substance (cocaine), a Third Degree Felony, and one count of possession of a controlled 
substance (marijuana), a Class B Misdemeanor. 
The parties, agreed in part, that the verbatim transcript of the Preliminary Hearing 
could be used as the factual basis for the suppression motion, but upon further query from Judge 
Frederick, augmented the transcript testimony with additional testimony taken from Deputies 
Russo and Sterner, who were sworn and testified, wherein the Court received and makes the 
following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. That on December 27, 1993, the above-said deputies, along with two other 
police officers, went to the residence of defendant, Steven Wells and a co-defendant, Kelly 
Jensen (female), for the purpose of effectuating an arrest of both individuals, pursuant to existing 
arrest warrants for said defendants. Deputy Russo was well acquainted with Wells and Jensen, 
having arrested defendants on three to four occasions in the past for narcotics offenses, to include 
searching the same said premises for controlled substances, and had also used Wells as an 
informant in the past; 
2. The purpose for going to the premises was to arrest said individuals, and no 
search warrants had been obtained, nor were any sought, prior to their arrival at the suspect 
premises known as: 3809 South 400 East, Salt Lake City, Utah; 
3. Because Russo is known to defendants, Deputy Paul Christensen knocked on 
a sliding door that was partially secured by a wooden dowel inserted in the slide track. When 
defendant Wells came to the door, the deputy asked if Steven Wells was present, at which time 
the defendant advised the deputy that he was not there. Russo, who was hiding to the side of the 
door recognized Wells, and told him to open up, at which time Wells ran down the stairs yelling 
"its Russo again" with additional words to that effect, and while running down the stairs reached 
into his pocket; 
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4. Officers announced their presence, the fact that they had outstanding warrants 
for Wells and Jensen, and told Wells to open the door, which he again failed to do. Officers 
proceeded to break the sliding door glass by use of a shovel to gain entry, and proceeded to go 
down the stairs in pursuit of defendant; 
5. While proceeding down the stairs, Officer Sterner was attacked by a dog 
inside the premises. Once in the basement, the officers located the co-defendant, Kelly Jensen, 
who was also placed under arrest, after she was found hiding in a closet. In plain view on a 
counter top near where Jensen was located, Officer Sterner observed a small baggie of what he 
believed to be marijuana, and two smoking pipes nearby. While questioning Jensen, she directed 
Officer Russo to a jacket that belonged to Wells, and which Officer Russo was familiar with, 
having arrested Wells while wearing said jacket on prior occasions. She also told Russo to look 
in a vacuum cleaner that was nearby the location where Wells had been arrested; 
6. In searching the jacket lining, a jawbreaker size quantity of cocaine was found, 
and when the vacuum was opened up, an additional small baggie of a leafy substance wrapped 
similarly to the previously found baggie of marijuana was also found. The substance in the 
baggies and the powder found in the jacket were analyzed by the Utah State Crime Laboratory 
and found to be marijuana and cocaine; 
7. The co-defendant, Kelly Jensen, while in the presence of Wells, maintained 
that the controlled substances belonged to Wells, who, although present, and capable of 
speaking, never denied that the drugs were in fact his. Officers did not fully search the premises, 
other than as indicated above, and both suspects were booked into jail; 
8. Based upon the initial observation by the officers that Wells was reaching into 
his pants while running down the stairs yelling, Jensen was asked where the drugs were, and she 
was the one that directed the officers' attention to the jacket and the vacuum cleaner. Officers did 
not initiate a search of the premises, other than to seize the "plain view" baggie of marijuana and 
pipes on the counter top. 
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Based upon the foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT and by a preponderance of the 
evidence submitted at said hearing, the Court hereby makes the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Section 77-7-11, Utah Code Annotated, as amended in 1980, provides that 
"any peace officer who has knowledge of an outstanding warrant of arrest may arrest a person he 
reasonable believes to be the person described in the warrant, without having physical possession 
of the warrant," and said officers properly used due force n effectuating the arrest warrant as 
provided in Sections 77-7-7 and 77-7-8, Utah Code Annotated, as amended, when they had to 
break in the sliding glass door, after defendant lied about his presence, refused to allow entry, 
and fled down the stairs away from the arresting officers; 
2. Several "exigent circumstances" existed or were created by the developing 
situation at the time of the arrest in the following particulars: (a) the defendant initially lied to 
officers as to his identity; (b) fled from the officers when he saw "Russo" at the door; (c) reached 
into his pocket to retrieve something while running down the stairs, that could have been either a 
weapon or contraband; (d) Deputy Sterner was attacked by a dog, which had to be subdued; (e) it 
was not known at the time how many suspects or third persons may have been in the basement 
who might have been potentially hazardous to officers; (f) both suspects were known drug users 
with prior arrests (g) previous searches had been conducted at said premises, and it was likely 
that suspects would conceal or destroy contraband if allowed sufficient time; (h) suspect, Jensen, 
was found hiding in the basement; (i) a portion of the marijuana and paraphernalia were observed 
in "plain view" by Officer Sterner while in custody of Jensen; (j) the officers limited the scope of 
their search to areas that could conceal suspects, and only searched objects that suspect Jensen 
directed them to while being questioned, incident to arrest; (k) the jacket, wherein cocaine was 
found, could easily house a weapon, justifying the search of that item of clothing, as well as the 
vacuum cleaner; and items of contraband were recovered from each, to-wit: cocaine and 
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3. Section 77-7-2, Utah Code Annotated, as amended in 1986, particularly 
specifies when exigent circumstances exist in warrant and warrantless arrests and searches when 
it provides that officers, armed with information that reasonable cause exists to believe that a 
public offense has been committed; by that suspect who attempts to flee or conceal himself; 
destroy or conceal evidence, or injure another person or damage property, may act to arrest and 
search this individual incident to said arrest; 
4. Not only did the officers believe this, they had knowledge, in fact, that 
outstanding warrants existed for both Wells and Jensen; observed Wells flee and possibly 
conceal evidence while doing so; and observed contraband in plain view while making lawful 
arrests of both suspects; 
5. Further, said officers did not use excessive force or broaden the scope of that 
arrest or seizure of the contraband seized, confining themselves to a reasonable protection search 
for suspects and possible weapons in the immediate proximity of the suspects; and it was Kelly, 
who prompted the discovery of the cocaine and marijuana, in property she and Wells had 
dominion and control over, when arrested. 
WHEREFORE, based upon the foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the defendant's Motion to Suppress 
Evidence, is hereby denied, there being a preponderance of evidence presented at said hearing to 
support statutory and constitutional exceptions to the search warrant requirements, mandated by 
state and federal law. 
DATED this ^ J ^ S y b f October, 1994. 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Findings of Fact and 
Concluions of Law Denying Motion to Suppress Evidence was delivered to Elizabeth A. 
Bowman, Attorney for Defendant Stephen Laine Wells, at 424 East>00 South, Suite 300, Salt 
Lake City, Utah 84111, on the. 
mrr/wells.doc 
day of October, 1994 
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